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Reduchig emissions from deforestation and degmdation (REDD) has emeiged as an
important4 albeit controversial, component of negotiations for a new international chmate change
regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol when it expies in 2012 Not permitted under the terms of
the Kyoto Protocol, REDD involves paying developing countries to protect their tropical forests as
a climate change ntigation stmtegy REDD gained widesprad attention by 2005 and took center
stage in the months precedng the negotiation ofthe Copenhagen Accord in December 2009. Aller
more than a decade of nonparticipation in international climate change compliance efforts, the
United States has signed the Copenhagen Accord which contains seveal provisions ad&essing
REDD Significant questions rman, however rgarding the manner and degre to which REDD
mechanisms will be implemented. One ofthe most criticallingering questions is the potential use
of REDD as a component of US participation in a post-Kyoto chmate change regime The
climate change legislation pending before Congress contais important prvisions addressing
REDD If signed into law, the US legislation would help promote the use of REDD as an
indspensable component ofan international carbon market and enable the United States to assume
a long-overdue leadetshp role in international climate change regulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
'People are fmally getting to the point where they understand that we can't
solve the climate change cnisis without solving the deforestation cisis."
-Jeff Horowitz,
Founder of Avoided Deforestation Partners'
The legacy of the Kyoto Protocol2 is a painful lesson in winning the
battle but losing the war in addressing global climate change. Although
the international community made significant reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions under the terms of the Protocol, three critical regulatory
gaps stymied the regime's ultimate success. First, the Protocol did not
provide an adequate international response to climate change because a
significant source of the climate change problem was omitted.
Deforestation and forest degradation release up to eighteen percent of
annual global carbon dioxide emissions,' yet these significant
contributing forces to the climate change problem were not included
within the regulatory scheme.' Second, the Kyoto Protocol did not
provide sufficiently effective mechanisms for developing countries to
have a meaningful role in addressing global climate change.' Third, and
1. Rhett Butler, Forest Conservation hi US. Clirate Poicy: An Interview with Jeff
Horowitz; MONGABAY.COM, Feb. 5, 2010, http://print.news.mongabay.com/2010/0205-adp-
forests_redd.html?print (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Addl, Dec. 10, 1997 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available
athttp://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
3. NICHoLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW, at xxv
(2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/226271-1170911056314/
3428109-1174614780539/SternReviewEng.pdf.
4. Although forest projects are eligible to earn tradable credits under the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) in the Kyoto Protocol, such projects are limited to afforestation
and reforestation and do not include avoided deforestation. See Bernard Schlamadinger et al.,
Should We Include Avoidance of Deforestation in the International Response to Climate
Change., in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 53,53 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan
Schwartzman eds., 2005); see also CLtMENT CHENOST ET AL., BRINGING FOREST CARBON
PROJECTS I THE MARKET 8-9, available at http://www.unep.fr/energy/activities/forestcarbon/
pdf/Guidebook/20English%2OFinal%2019-5-2010%20high%20res.pdf (last visited Sept. 19,
2010) (explaining why CDM forestry projects represent only 0.4% of all registered CDM
projects).
5. The CDM sought to engage developing countries by authorizing emissions reduction
partnerships between developed and developing nations; however, the mechanism was too narrow
and plagued by administrative complexity to achieve broad-based participation. For a discussion
of the CDM and some of the criticisms that have been lodged against it, see generally Ann E.
Prouty, The Clean Development Mechamsm and Its Implications for Cinate Justice, 34 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 513 (2009); Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanismk
Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1759 (2008); ANITA TALBERG & LESLIE NIELSON,
DEP'T OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVS., PARLIAMENT OF AusTL., THE KYolo PROTOCOL'S CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 15-20 (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.aph.gov.aullibrary/pubs/bn/2008-
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perhaps most significantly, the international community learned that any
international climate change agreement without the full participation of
the United States would be rendered virtually meaningless.
Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) is
a climate change compliance strategy that involves an indispensable
partnership between developed and developing countries to help ensure
the continuing viability of an international climate change treaty regime
to succeed the Kyoto Protocol upon its expiration in 2012. REDD
involves developed countries paying developing countries to protect their
tropical forests as an international climate change mitigation strategy.'
Therefore, REDD is a valuable mechanism to fill the first two regulatory
gaps in the Kyoto Protocol by fully engaging the developing world's
participation in climate change compliance efforts while embracing the
essential roles that deforestation and forest degradation play in the fight
against climate change.'
The third regulatory gap in the Kyoto Protocol-the nonpartici-
pation of the United States-remains a challenge; however, recent
developments offer at least some reason for hope. After more than a
decade of nonparticipation in international climate change compliance
efforts, the United States signed the Copenhagen Accord on January 28,
2010.' The Copenhagen Accord contains several provisions that address
09/KyotoProtocolCDM.pdf; Emma Paulsson, A Review of the CDMLitemture: From Fine-
Tuning to Critical Scrutiny?, 9 INT'L ENvTL. AGREEMENTS: POL. L. & EcoN. 63 (2009).
6. See About REDD+, UN-REDD PROGRAMME, http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/
tabid/582language/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 4, 2010). REDD seeks "to create a
financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to
reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development."
Id
7. In addition to serving as a potent mechanism to promote climate change compliance,
REDD also offers valuable co-benefits. Addressing climate change while offering valuable co-
benefits has been referred to as the "quadruple dividends" of REDD because REDD offers:
[C]limate dividends by sequestering carbon; environmental dividends by bolstering
watersheds and filtering air and groundwater; biodiversity dividends by providing
habitat for over two thirds of the world's ground based species of plants and animals;
and economic dividends, through sustainable land and forest management to improve
the livelihoods of forest-dependent communities, many of which are among the world's
poorest.
See Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degmdation (REDD)--An Interview
with Don Kanak Chaiman World Wildlife Fund Forest Carbon Initiative, CARBON INNOvATORS
NETwORK, Apr. 2010, http://www.carboninnovators.net.au/sites/carboninnovators.net.aulfiles/
images/10.4%20REDD%20-%20an%20interview/o20with%2ODon%20Kanak.pdf [hereinafter
Interview with Don Kanak].
8. See Alex Morales, US. Signs On to Copenhagen Climate Accord Pledges to Cut
C02, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=
amKfFOaRgQyA.
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REDD;' however, significant questions remain regarding how these
REDD mechanisms will be implemented.'o One of the most critical
lingering questions is the potential use of REDD as a component of U.S.
participation in a post-Kyoto climate change regime. The climate change
legislation pending before Congress in 2010 contains important
provisions addressing REDD.
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of REDD, from its
exclusion from the Kyoto Protocol to its rise to prominence on the road
to Copenhagen. Part II discusses the REDD provisions in the
Copenhagen Accord and considers the role of REDD+ as a vehicle to
promote an international carbon market in a post-Kyoto climate change
agreement. Part 11 describes the relevant provisions of the climate
change legislation pending before Congress and considers the
effectiveness of the provisions of the House and Senate versions of the
legislation that address the use of REDD. This Article concludes that the
pending U.S. legislation would promote an international carbon market
and would provide a foundation for the U.S. to embrace a long-overdue
opportunity for leadership in international climate change compliance
efforts.
II. FROM KYOTO TO COPENHAGEN: REDD's PATH TO PROMINENCE
During the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, REDD was considered, and
ultimately rejected, for inclusion as one of the flexibility mechanisms" in
the Protocol.2 Several concerns were cited to support the exclusion of
REDD from the Protocol's regulatory framework: "Many believed that
the challenges and uncertainties inherent to quantifying forest sector
emissions would weaken the overall strength of the climate regime, and
developing countries worried that a plan to reduce deforestation would
threaten their sovereignty over land use decisions, and subsequently their
right to develop.""
Although REDD was excluded from the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) nevertheless provided a narrow
9. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the
Parties, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-18, 2009, Copenhagen Accor4 6, 8, 10, U.N. Doc. FCCC/
CP/2009/ 11/Add.1 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord].
10. For a discussion of these implementation concerns, see infir Part II.B.
11. The flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol are: (1) emissions trading in article
17, (2) joint implementation in article 6, and (3) the Clean Development Mechanism in article 12.
Kyoto Protocol, supm note 2, arts. 6, 12, 17.
12. Crystal Davis, Protecting Forests To Save the Climate: REDD Challenges and
Opportunities, EARTH TRENDs, Apr. 23, 2008, http://earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/303.
13. Id
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window of opportunity for the forestry sector to be considered within the
Protocol's climate change compliance framework.14 The CDM allows
industrialized countries to earn carbon credits from reforestation and
afforestation projects in developing countries." To date, however, this
mechanism has involved forestry projects to a very limited degree."
Following on the coattails of the CDM's failure to promote
protection and enhancement of forests, REDD seeks to ensure that the
daunting scope of deforestation's impacts on climate change is no longer
overlooked. "'[A]nnual emissions from deforestation are approximately
equivalent to the annual carbon emissions from the United States, and are
a greater contributor to pollution than all of the world's cars, trains,
planes, and ships combined.""' REDD's journey in international climate
change diplomacy since the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol has been a
circuitous yet productive progression that has gained momentum within
the past two years.
The formal inclusion of REDD in climate change negotiations
began in 2005 at the Eleventh Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol (COP 11) in Montreal." Spearheaded by the Coalition of
Rainforest Nations,20 a group of developing nations with a high
percentage of tropical rainforests that support the use of carbon credits to
curb tropical deforestation, REDD was proposed as a way to enhance
developing nations' contribution to climate change compliance.2'
REDD made a significant step forward at COP 13 in Bali in
December 2007. REDD was expressly included as part of the Bali
14. Id.
15. Afforestation refers to anthropogenic conversion of nonforested areas into forested
land that has not been forested for at least fifty years, whereas reforestation refers to such
conversion of nonforested areas that have not been forested since December 31, 1989. R6mulo
Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties: The Evolvig Debates on Forest
and Forestry Activities Under the Clean Development Mechanism Ten Years After the Kyoto
Protocol, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 634, 643 (2008).
16. See CHENOST ET AL., supra note 4, at 8-9 (explaining why CDM forestry projects
represent only 0.4% of all registered CDM projects).
17. See Butler, supm note 1 (quoting Jeff Horowitz).
18. For a comprehensive summary of the evolution of REDD from Kyoto to Copenhagen,
see generally VIVIENNE HOLLOWAY & ESTEBAN GIANDOMENICO, CARBON PLANET WHITE PAPER:
THE HISTORY OF REDD POLICY (2009), http://www.carbonplanet.com/protected-downloads/
white-papers/fhe-HistoryofLREDD.pdf.
19. See Butler, supra note 1.
20. See genemlly COALITION FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS, http://www.rainforestcoalition.
org (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
21. See Butler, supra note 1.
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Action Plan," which was a strategy of necessary steps in moving toward
a post-Kyoto climate change treaty in 2012. The Bali Action Plan calls
for "[p]olicy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in
developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in
developing countries."" Despite the progress on REDD in Bali, many
implementation challenges remained before REDD could be integrated
effectively into a post-Kyoto climate change treaty regime.24
The implementation challenges that critics have raised about REDD
led to the creation of REDD+ as a "new and improved" way of thinking
about REDD for the future. REDD's evolution into REDD+ at the
Poznan negotiations in December 2008, and the Bonn negotiations in
March 2009, helped propel the hope that REDD would be instrumental
at Copenhagen. REDD's evolution to REDD+ involved a transition to an
enhanced, broad-based approach that includes conservation, sustainable
forest management, and forest carbon stock enhancement.25
In addition to REDD+, two other dimensions of REDD's evolution
also were active in the two years prior to Copenhagen: the World Bank
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)" and the UN-REDD
Programme.27 Established in 2007 at COP 13 in Bali, the FCPF evaluates
the feasibility of proposals from developing countries to receive REDD
22. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the
Parties, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3-15, 2007, BaliAction Plan, art. 1(b)(iii), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/
6/Add.l (Mar. 14, 2008), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop/3/eng/06a01.pdf.
23. Id.
24. See Steve Zwick & Katherine Hamilton, REDD Hot n Bali-and Very Confusng,
EARTH NEWS, Dec. 28, 2007, http://www.earthportal.org/news/?p=766 ("[B]ecause of the
challenges of commoditizing REDD activities into the general carbon markets, several groups
have proposed that REDD activities be separated from the current Kyoto carbon markets."). One
example, proposed by Greenpeace, is "Tropical Deforestation Emission Reduction Units," which
would treat REDD credits as separate from those earned under the Clean Development
Mechanism. Id. Other implementation concerns involve "the negative impacts REDD payments
might have on forest-dependent communities, primarily through further weakening of their land
and resource rights" and "complex links with agriculture" that could impact food supply and
other agricultural products. REDD: Protecting Climate, Forests, andLivelihoods INT'L INST. FOR
ENv'T & DEv., http://www.iied.org/natural-resources/key-issues/forestry/redd-protecting-climate-
forests-and-livelihoods (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
25. CHARUE PARKER ET AL., GLOBAL CANOPY PROGRAvME, THE LITLE REDD+ BOOK 14
(2009), http://www.globalcanopy.org/themedia/file/PDFs/LRB-lowres/lrb en.pdf; HOLLOWAY &
GIANDOMENICO, supra note 18, at 4. For a detailed discussion of REDD+ and its possible role as
a component of a post-Kyoto climate change treaty, see inia Part UIl.B.
26. For more information about the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, see
About the FCPF, FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP, http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcpl
node/12 (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
27. About REDD+, supra note 6.
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financing for climate-related projects. 28 To be eligible for funding and
technical assistance, the developing countries must establish that they
have a valid method in place to measure and monitor climate-related
benefits. 29 Similarly, the UN-REDD Programme was developed in 2008
as a source of funding for REDD projects in developing countries.o The
program, which features a multidonor fund, is a collaborative initiative of
the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, the U.N. Development
Programme, and the U.N. Environment Programme."
The months leading up to COP 15 in Copenhagen in December
2009 were filled with anticipation that a new international climate
change treaty would be negotiated. Part of that optimism was due to the
ongoing evolution of REDD and its status as the possible missing link to
break the stalemate in international climate change negotiations. Prior to
Copenhagen, forest countries worked hard to make progress toward the
goal of incorporating REDD as part of a post-Kyoto climate change
regime. This work has many facets, including "collaboration on laws and
regulations to establish ... a governance structure for REDD, clarifying
who owns forest carbon rights .. ., and promoting REDD projects on the
ground to demonstrate the ability to measure and monitor and account
for forest carbon."" COP 15 in Copenhagen offered the promise to be
the first significant step forward for REDD as a component of the future
climate change regime. As Part 1H of this Article discusses, at least part
of that promise was fulfilled.
III. THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD, REDD, AND THE GLOBAL CARBON
MARKET
Carbon markets have developed rapidly since the Kyoto Protocol's
emissions reduction commitments entered into force in 2005." During
this period, mandatory carbon markets, both within and outside of the
Kyoto Protocol's compliance scheme, and voluntary carbon markets were
established.' However, the mandatory regimes have been limited to
28. See About the FCPF supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. See REDD: Pmotecting Climate, Forests, andLiveloods supra note 24.
31. Id.
32. See Interview with Don Kanak supra note 7.
33. In 2010, the value of the global carbon market climbed to $170 billion, up thirty-three
percent from 2009. Global Carbon Market Worth $170 Billion m 2010, Up 33 Per Cent CPI
FIN., Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.cpifinancial.net/v2/print.aspx?pgnews&aid=4234.
34. CHENOST ET AL., supra note 4, at 24. For a discussion of the evolution and functions
of voluntary carbon markets, see generally Michelle Passero, The Voluntary Carbon Market: Its
Contributions and Potential Legal and Policy Issues, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING:
KYolo, COPENHAGEN, AND BEYOND 517-33 (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2009).
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regional efforts and have not drawn on avoided deforestation credits."
The most prominent among these regional carbon markets is the
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), which has
received considerable attention." In addition, within the past few years,
voluntary carbon markets based on REDD have emerged and are
working effectively." The success of the EU carbon market, and the
preliminary promise of voluntary carbon markets using avoided
deforestation credits, offer hope that an international carbon market
bolstered by the authorized use of avoided deforestation credits and the
full participation of the United States could evolve in the wake of
Copenhagen.
A. 'REDD-Eyed"Assessment of the Copenhagen Accord
The much-anticipated Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol was held in Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009.
In the months leading up to the meeting, hopes were high that the
conference would produce a mandatory agreement with ambitious
emissions reduction targets. Within weeks of the meeting, however,
major industrialized nations had already conceded that such an
agreement would not be achieved at Copenhagen." Toward the end of
the meeting, many feared that even a nonbinding agreement would not be
forthcoming. In the end, the Copenhagen Accord emerged as the product
of two weeks of intensive negotiations. The outcome of Copenhagen
35. CHENOST ET AL., supra note 4, at 32 (noting that the European emissions trading
system does not accept forest carbon credits).
36. The EU-ETS is the largest carbon market in the world, both in terms of value and
volume. Id For a critical review of the EU-ETS, see generally Marisa Martin, Trade Law
Implications of Resticting Participation n The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 19
GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 437 (2007); Jonathan Donehower, Comment, Analyzing Carbon
Emissions Tmding: A Potential Cost Efficient Mechanism To Reduce Carbon Emissions, 38
ENVTL. L. LEwis & CLARK L. SCH. 177 (2008); Brettny Hardy, Note, HowPositive Environmental
Politics Affected Europet Decision To Oppose and Then Adopt Emissions Tradmng, 17 DUKE
ENVM. L. & PoL'Y F 297 (2007).
37. See, e.g., CHENOST ET AL., supra note 4, at 35 (discussing a voluntary REDD project
in the Juma Reserve in the Brazilian Amazon). For a discussion of the challenges involved in
seeking to integrate REDD principles into a post-Kyoto international climate change treaty
regime, see generally Robert O'Sullivan & Rick Saines, International Market Solutions To Protect
Topical Raafowrsts, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING: KYOTO, COPENHAGEN, AND
BEYOND, supra note 34, at 584-605.
38. See Suzanne Goldenberg & John Vidal, US Scales Down Hopes of Global Climate
Change Teaty in Copenhagen, GUARDIAN, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/nov/04/us-climate-change-copenhagen-treaty.
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generated significant debate as to whether the meeting was a positive
step forward or a tremendous disappointment."
In some respects, the Copenhagen Accord represents important
progress in international climate change diplomacy. First, almost all
major industrialized nations, including the United States, have signed the
agreement.' Second, references to REDD and REDD+ appear through-
out its provisions.4' For example, paragraph 6 acknowledges the critical
role of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation to
"enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed
countries" to reduce global greenhouse emissions.42 To implement this
objective, paragraph 8 provides that developed countries will provide $30
billion in adaptation funding in the period 2010-2012 to the "most
vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries,
small island developing States and Africa."' Third, the Accord reflects
the shift from Kyoto's exclusive focus on mitigation to the need to
address adaptation as an essential component of any post-Kyoto
international climate change agreement.
Notwithstanding these positive steps, Copenhagen critics had ample
grounds on which to be disappointed with the outcome of the meeting.
First, no binding emission reduction targets were established and there
was not even a commitment to a binding post-Kyoto treaty." Second, the
Accord contains little guidance regarding how to implement the REDD
provisions in the agreement.
39. See, e.g., Leslie Carothers, Closing Statement Wonderful Copenhagen, ENvTL. F.,
Mar.Apr. 2010, at 56, 56; Tom Mounteer, Did Copenhagen Give Climate Change Legislation
Any "Bounce" in the Senate?, [Mar. 2010] 40 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) at 10248;
CLMATCO, COPENHAGEN DE-BRIEFING: AN ANALYSIS OF COP15 FOR LONG-TERM COMPARISON
(Jan. 2010), http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/post-copl5-report52.
pdf; WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE (WWF), THE COPENHAGEN AccORD: A STEPPING STONE?
(Jan. 2010), http://assets.panda.org/downloads/the-stepping-stonefinal_2801 10.pdf.
40. See Alex Morales, Worldk Biggest Emitters Sign Up to Copenhagen Accord
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601081&sid=aD.Mbb
EYBSZE.
41. See CopenhagenAccord, supm note 9, 6, 8, 10.
42. Id. T 6.
43. Id. 1 8. Developed nations also pledged significant funding (up to $100 billion/year
by 2020) to support developing nations' efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Id.
44. See Alden Meyer, The Copenhagen Accord Not Everyting We Wanted But
Something To Build On, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/global
warning/solutions/big-picturesolutions/the-copenhagen-accord.html (last modified Dec. 23,
2009); see also John 0. Niles, Chaos and the Accord: Clinate Change, Tropical Forests and
REDD+ A-fer Copenhagen, MONGABAY.COM, Apr. 6, 2010, http://news.mongabay.com/2010/
0406-nilescopenhagen.accord.html ("The Copenhagen Accord rests in legal, political and
environmental limbo.").
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Nevertheless, the negotiations on REDD were deemed so important
that some commentators regarded the progress on REDD at Copenhagen
as a ray of hope in an otherwise disappointing conference.45
Transforming that sense of hope regarding REDD's potential into an
effective component of a post-Kyoto climate change treaty's compliance
regime will be a tremendous challenge.
B. REDD+ and the Post-Copenhagen Outlook
The REDD concept is elegant in its simplicity and easy to support
in principle; however, the challenge of how to implement it effectively
has generated significant controversy. The devil is in the details. This
controversy has generated several proposals for how REDD can be
implemented to fulfill its objectives." Chief among these proposals is
the approach known as REDD+. One commentator effectively
summarized the range of challenges reflected in REDD implementation
with the following series of questions:
What financing mechanism should be used for a REDD scheme? A
market-based system? A Fund? Should a ton of carbon from a forest
project sold on a carbon exchange be fungible with a ton of carbon
emission reductions from a factory? At what scale do you measure forest
protection? At a project scale? At a national scale? Should REDD
schemes be restricted to tropical forests? Or does it even make sense to
limit it to forests when other systems, such as wetlands, are also critically
important from a climate perspective? How do you make sure local and
indigenous benefits participate so that their rights are fully respected and
the financial benefits don't all get swallowed up by governments and large
corporations?"
As the leading effort to address these daunting challenges, REDD+
is the next step in the evolution of crediting avoided tropical deforestation
as a climate change compliance mechanism. REDD+ is more broad-
45. For a critique of the adequacy of the REDD language in the Copenhagen Accord, see
Steve Zwick, Bnght REDD Spot in Otherwise Dismal Copenhagen Accod ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.
page.php?pageid=7395&section-home#close; REDD May Yet Survive Copenhagen Failures,
CARBONPosmVE.NET, Dec. 21, 2009, http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articlelD-
1786.
46. See Crystal Davis, Protectig Forests To Save the Climate: REDD Challenges and
Opportunities, EARTH TRENDS, Apr. 23, 2008, http://earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/303
(discussing how "questions of how to design and implement a mechanism to achieve REDD are
proving exceptionally complex and controversial," which is generating "uncertainty that it will
generate real benefits for the global climate, forests and forest communities").
47. Wild Guy, REDD Alert WLD FouND. (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.wild.org/blog/
red-alert/.
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based than REDD in that it also includes conservation of carbon stocks
in low deforestation countries, sustainable forest management, and
afforestation and reforestation.48 REDD+ also benefits from U.N.
support, which is essential for its viability.49 REDD+ seeks to establish a
single international agency for monitoring and financing REDD
activities."o REDD+ may, however, need to be phased in over time after
REDD mechanisms are implemented.
Although long-term financing of REDD activities is not specified
in the Copenhagen Accord, within two months after Copenhagen "six
countries pledged $3.5 billion over three years to fund activities needed
to lay the groundwork for an eventual REDD mechanism."" In a
welcome break from its track record of disengagement from climate
change diplomacy, the United States contributed $1 billion to the $3.5
billion pool.52
Two recent international meetings addressed funding and
implementation strategy for REDD+ as a potentially viable mechanism
for a post-Kyoto treaty. In May 2010, fifty-two nations gathered in Oslo,
Norway, for a climate change and forests conference." The meeting was
regarded as an important step forward for REDD+ negotiations as the
international community prepares for the climate change treaty
negotiations at COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010." Several
countries, including the United States, pledged $4 billion for the period
2010-2012 to assist developing countries in reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation."
At the climate talks in Bonn, Germany, in June 2010, provisions for
REDD were discussed in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term
48. See Butler, supm note 1.
49. See About REDD+, supra note 6.
50. Ian Macdougall, Germany Norway Give $1.5B To Fight Deforestation, USA TODAY,
May 26, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/2010-05-26-germany-forests
N.htm.
51. See Butler, suprd note 1.
52. Id.
53. Climate Change Commission Joins 52 Countries in REDD+ Partnershi-Alvare
BALITA.PH, May 30, 2010, http://balita.ph/2010/05/30/climate-change-commission-joins-52-
countries-in-redd-partnership-alvarez/.
54. Id. Robert Zoellick, chief of the World Bank, remarked that the outcome of the Oslo
meeting may "be the first comprehensive component for a future international agreement on
climate change." Oslo Climate Change Conference Report-May Feature, COOLEARTH.ORG,
http://www.coolearth.org/371/news-32/features-147/oslo-climate-change-conference-report-may-
feature-1400.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).
55. Ian MacDougall, Rich Counties Pledge $4B To Stop Deforestation, SIGN ON SAN
DIEGo, May 27, 2010, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/may/27/rich-countries-pledge-
4b-tl-stop-deforestation/.
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Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) issued a guideline text to
facilitate negotiations among parties in the AWG-LCA. These guidelines
call for enhanced action on mitigation and its associated means of
implementation for developed and developing countries." The guidelines
also recognize
the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest
degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission
by forests, and . . . the need to provide positive incentives to such actions
through immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus,
to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed
countries."
Developing countries are encouraged to contribute to mitigation actions,
pursuant to provisions of REDD+ as described in chapter VI of the
guidelines, by undertaking activities such as reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conserving forest carbon stocks,
instituting sustainable management practices, and enhancing carbon
stock." The guidelines also encourage financial assistance and
investment mechanisms for developing countries."
As these developments demonstrate, the "evolution and progress of
the new REDD+ mechanism will significantly influence the overall
trajectory of international climate change policy."' However, despite the
valuable first step that the Copenhagen Accord may represent, and
despite the promising developinents that have unfolded at Oslo and Bonn
in the months following Copenhagen, two significant obstacles remain in
the path of the future success of REDD. First, there are some concerns
and limitations associated with REDD implementation such as its
impacts on indigenous peoples" and a possible increase in forest fires
from REDD implementation.' Second, the ultimate success of any post-
56. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties,
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Bonn,
Ger., June 1-11, 2010, Text To Facilitate Negotiations Among Parties, Annex 1, at 6, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/6 (May 17, 2010), http://vnfcc.int/resource/docs/2010/awglical0/eng/06.
pdf.
57. Id. at 11.
58. Id
59. Id. at 12.
60. Niles, supra note 44.
61. See Rhett A. Butler, REDD May Ham Forest People, Alleges Repot,
MONGABAY.COM, Dec. 2, 2008, http://news.mongabay.com/2008/1202-fern_redd.html.
62. See Helen Mendes, REDD Alert for Fowrst Clnate Change Policy, Sci. & DEv.
NETwoRK, June 7, 2010, http://www.scidev.net/en/news/redd-alert-for-forest-climate-change-
policy.html.
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Kyoto treaty regime weighs heavily on the shoulders of the United States.
If the United States fails to enact cap-and-trade legislation in the wake of
Copenhagen, the opportunity for an effective global carbon credits
market would be all but lost.
IV. How EFFECTIVE IS PROPOSED U.S. LEGISLATION IN PROMOTING
THE GOALS OF A GLOBAL CARBON MARKET?
For political and legal reasons, the United States has been
conspicuously parked on the sidelines of the international climate change
compliance regime for more than a decade." Long-awaited progress in
seeking to establish federal and international action on climate change
has been achieved under the Obama Administration, however. The
Waxman-Markey Bill passed the House of Representatives in 2009 by a
219-212 vote.' The Kerry-Lieberman Bill, pending before the Senate as
of this writing, is facing many obstacles. Both of these bills seek to
"slow deforestation by allowing international [avoided deforestation]
projects to receive tradable offset credits for sequestered carbon.' This
Part of the Article reviews the relevant provisions of the House and
Senate bills and how they relate to the development of an international
market for avoided deforestation credits. It concludes that both bills offer
a solid foundation for U.S. leadership in promoting a global carbon
market for avoided deforestation credits.
A. Summary ofProposed US. Climate Change Legislation
The REDD provisions in the House and Senate climate change bills
offer hope that some version of U.S. climate change legislation will pass
in 2010 or 2011. The reason for optimism lies in the "win-win" situation
that these provisions offer to simultaneously protect the environment and
63. For a discussion of the legal and policy challenges that the United States faces in
entering an emissions trading market and the relationship that such a market would have on its
environmental laws and trade policy, see generally K. Russell LaMotte, David M. (Max)
Williamson & Lauren A. Hopkins, Emissions Trading in the US.: Legal Issues, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING: KYOTO, COPENHAGEN, AND BEYOND, supa note 34, at 391-422.
64. Greg Hitt & Stephen Power, House Passes Clmate Bill, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2009, at
Al, available athttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB124602039232560485.html.
65. KEN ALLINSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AvOIDED DEFORESTATION OFFSET PROJECTS:
INSuRING THE RISK OF REVERSAL PENALTIES 2 (May 2010), http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/
clear/adoffsetreversalpenaltyinsurance.pdf. Debate continues on the viability of international
offsets as a climate change mitigation strategy. This lack of consensus on the value of offsets
could significantly impair the potential success of the pending climate change legislation in the
United States. For a helpful analysis of the principal concerns and possible solutions regarding
how to integrate international offsets into climate legislation, see generally The Forum: The
UpsetAboutInternational Offsets, ENvrL. F., May/June 2010, at 48, 48-53.
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boost the economy. "'Beyond the obvious and most significant benefits
of reducing pollution, saving our biodiversity and protecting forest-
dependent communities, protecting tropical forests will cut the cost of
U.S. climate legislation almost in half-saving Americans billions."'
The relationship between tropical deforestation and domestic
enterprises provides an additional hidden benefit to help secure the
necessary votes for passage of climate legislation in the Senate.
"'[E]nding tropical deforestation will provide direct economic benefits to
American farmers, cattle ranchers and timber industry workers. Illegal
and unsustainable overseas ranching, soy, and timber operations are
undercutting more sustainable and responsible operations, potentially
jeopardizing American jobs in our heartland.'".
In addition, both bills address rights and needs of indigenous
peoples and forest-dependent communities by requiring consultations
with, and the participation of, these communities in the process." There
are, however, some differences in how the bills address the promotion of
international offsets for avoided deforestation.
The Waxman-Markey Bill (H.R. 2454), also known as the
American Clean Energy and Security Act," contains several provisions
that are relevant for considering its impact on the global carbon credits
market. The Bill would rely on the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) for implementation.
The Waxman-Markey Bill would establish a federal cap-and-trade
system that would include international avoided deforestation offsets as
part of its scheme." The Bill contains more detail than the Kerry-
Lieberman Bill on the administration and implementation of REDD
projects. For example, the Waxman-Markey Bill addresses the types of
activities that could be funded and addresses monitoring and reporting
requirements.72 It would also provide flexibility in determining the
amount of eligible international offsets based on the EPA's assessment of
domestic offsets."
66. Butler, supra note 1 (quoting Jeff Horowitz).
67. Id. (quoting Jeff Horowitz).
68. PERVAZE A. SHEIKH & Ross W GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERNATIONAL
FORESTRY IssuEs IN CLIMATE CHANGE BILLS: COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS OF S. 1733 AND H.R.
2454, at 12-13 (2009).
69. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 110th Cong. (2009),
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1 1lcongbills&docid-f:h2454pcs.txt.pdf.
70. SHEIKH & GORTE, supm note 68, at 3.
71. H.R. 2454, § 734(e).
72. SHEiKH & GORTE, supra note 68, at 5-6.
73. Id at 9.
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The Kerry-Lieberman Bill, also known as the American Power
Act,74 has been plagued by controversy from its inception. It does not
appear to be as ambitious as the Waxman-Markey Bill in promoting
international offset opportunities. Nevertheless, for the reasons outlined
below, the Kerry-Lieberman Bill still offers a workable start for the
United States to enter the international offsets playing field.
While the Kerry-Lieberman Bill provides for substantial use of
offsets as part of its cap-and-trade scheme, the benefits from those
offsets would stay largely within U.S. borders." The Bill would create
two new agencies to administer the international offsets program: the
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction and Sequestration Advisory
Committee" and the International Offsets Integrity Advisory
Committee." Although the Bill would provide domestic benefits for U.S.
forestry and landowners, it does not offer significant support for
international offset credits generated from avoided deforestation in
developing countries."
There are several limitations that the Bill imposes on international
offsets and REDD projects." First, international offsets are available
only to developing countries that are involved in a bilateral or multilateral
agreement with the United States.o Second, international offsets can be
generated only by developing countries that adopt policies to reduce
emissions across an entire sector of the nation's economy. "' Third, the
REDD provision of the Bill only allows for national and subnational
level REDD projects, rather than approving such offsets on a project-by-
project basis.82 Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the Kerry-Lieberman Bill
74. American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2010) (discussion draft),
http://kerry.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/APAbi113.pdf.
75. Climate Bil/ Mixed for Forest Carbon Offsets, CARBONPOSYBVE.NET, May 14, 2010,
http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articlelD- 1999.
76. S. 1733, § 732. This agency would provide "scientific and technical advice on the
establishment and implementation of the offset project program." Id. § 732(a)(1).
77. Id. § 752. This agency would be responsible for "promulgating and revising
regulations," "ensuring the overall environmental integrity of the programs established pursuant to
those regulations," and conducting a "scientific review of international offset and deforestation
reduction programs." Id § 752(a)(2)(A)-(B), (d).
78. Climate Bill Mixed for Forest Carbon Offsets, supra note 75.
79. The international offset provisions of the Bill appear in sections 751-763; the REDD
provision appears in section 5004.
80. Jake Schmidt, Tools for Supporting International Action on Global armnung:
Amencan Power Act SwrrcHBoARD: NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (May 13,
2010), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/j schmidt/apa.intl-provisions.html.
81. Id.; see also Clinate BI Mixed for Forest Carbon Offsets, supra note 75.
82. John Vidaurrazaga, Trees Fare Well in Latest US Climate Bill, ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE, May 24, 2010, http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.
page.php?pageid=7565&section=newsarticles&eod=1.
109
TULANE J OF INT'L & COMP LAW
appears to be an "imperfect but necessary step in the right direction" for
development of the international REDD market."
B. Proposed US Legislation Would Help Advance a Global Carbon
Market
The forecast for potential inclusion of avoided deforestation credits
in a post-Kyoto regime remains cloudy. There are several complicating
factors involved. First, the concept of REDD needs to garner an even
broader base of support. For example, there are influential organizations
within the environmental community, such as Greenpeace, that oppose
REDD and maintain that "[i]nclusion of forest conservation in a market-
based mechanism for reducing greenhouse gas emissions would crash
carbon prices by swamping the market with cheap credits."' For REDD
to succeed the second time around and avoid being excluded as it was in
the Kyoto negotiations, it is imperative that a consensus be established
for a minimum baseline model of REDD that has unconditional support
from the environmental community. Otherwise, a post-Kyoto treaty
could return to "business as usual" and exclude REDD from its
regulatory framework because it is too controversial and fraught with
uncertainty.
Second, and more importantly, the implementing mechanisms and
processes for REDD need to be further developed. The concept of
REDD has become increasingly popular since 2005, but even its biggest
supporters acknowledge that it faces many challenges to be implemented
effectively. Significant progress has been made in this regard in the past
few years with REDD+ and building "REDD readiness"" in developing
countries, but much work remains.
Third, as is true in seeking to regulate any international
environmental law problem, adequate funding is essential to ensure
success. REDD is off to a good start in this regard, but failure to pass
climate change legislation in the United States could change that reality
abruptly.
8 3. Id.
84. Carbon Credits from Forest Conservation Would Crash Carbon Marke4 Says
Greenpeace, MONGABAY.COM, Mar. 30, 2009, http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0330-greenpeace-
redd.html.
85. REDD readiness refers to "developing a baseline reference scenario for a country's
historical and projected deforestation rates, as well as adopting strategies to reduce forest clearing
and designing systems to monitor, report and verify reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from
avoided deforestation." REDD Readiness Plans for Panama, Guyana Approved but Rejected for
Indonesia, MONGABAY.COM, July 2, 2009, http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0702-fcpf.html.
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The Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman Bills fare well on all
three of these challenges. The Bills embrace the concept of REDD as an
important dimension of the U.S. approach to climate change mitigation
and include provisions addressing how the United States could be
involved in this aspect of climate change regulation. While the
implementing mechanisms and funding for avoided deforestation
projects require clarification and additional attention, they nonetheless
provide an adequate foundation upon which thb United States can read
the post-Kyoto regime in advancing the availability of such offset credits
in a global carbon market.
The remainder of 2010 will hold many answers for the fate of the
proposed U.S climate change legislation. Further complicating the
prospect for U.S. involvement in international avoided deforestation
projects is that the Kerry-Lieberman Bill could become incorporated as
part of a larger clean energy bill to ensure passage of some form of
climate bill. This potential manipulation could further dilute the already-
limited international offset provisions of the Kerry-Lieberman Bill.
V. CONCLUSION
In his opening remarks at the climate change and forests conference
in Oslo in May 2010, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg
declared, "Forests are worth more dead than alive. Today we commit to
change that equation."" He further remarked that curbing deforestation
can achieve the "largest, fastest and cheapest cuts in global emissions" of
greenhouse gases." REDD and REDD+ are the mechanisms to make his
vision a reality in a post-Kyoto international climate change treaty.
REDD fills three regulatory gaps left by the Kyoto Protocol: (1) the
need to address avoided deforestation as a compliance strategy, (2) the
need to more fully engage developing countries in international climate
change compliance, and (3) the need to involve the United States in the
international climate change regulatory landscape. If a post-Kyoto
climate change agreement fails to address avoided tropical deforestation
adequately, the overall compliance goals in the agreement would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to attain. But even if such an
agreement is forged in the coming years, it would be doomed to fall short
of its goals, as Kyoto did, without full participation from the United
States. If enacted, the pending U.S. climate legislation would provide a
86. Ian Macdougall, International Conference To Save Forests Opens in Oslo, USA
TODAY, May 27, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/envirornent/2010-05-27-oslo-
conference N.htm (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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critical boost to promote the use of REDD as an indispensable
component of an international carbon market.
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe in the Gulf of
Mexico in May 2010, the timing could not be better for the United States
to not only enter the international climate change playing field, but
assume a long-overdue leadership role in defining its future.
International offsets for avoided deforestation must be a part of the
United States' participation in this challenge. Regardless of the details of
the language that ultimately appears in the U.S. climate legislation, the
fate of the post-Copenhagen era in international climate change
diplomacy rests largely within U.S. control. Kyle Danish, head of the
climate change practice at Van Ness Feldman in Washington, D.C.,
remarked on this reality:
[T]he likelihood that the climate negotiations can progress from the accord
blueprint to a fully elaborated program may be a function of further
developments in the United States. Other countries have limited incentives
to follow through on mitigation commitments without corresponding
action by the United States. And the financial assistance program relies
significantly on participation by the United States."
The same can be said about the fate of the role of REDD in a post-Kyoto
climate change treaty. All eyes are on the United States to provide much-
needed leadership on this issue.
88. Kyle Danish, New and Impoved Couise for a Clnate Regime, ENvrL. F, Mar/Apr.
2010, at 48.
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